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INTRODUCTION
The Utah State Tax Commission petitions this Court for
a rehearing to reconsider two points of law in its decision
issued on November 13, 2000.
A.)

(A copy is attached as Exhibit

Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35, a rehearing is

appropriate when there is a misstatement of the law. It is
not the intent of this Petition to change the ultimate
holding of this Court which reversed the decision of the Tax
Commission, but rather to alert the Court of certain
misstatements of the law contained in the Order.

This

petition is filed in good faith and not for delay.
The first statement deals with the Commission's power
to lower tax rates which exceed the certified rate. The
second statement concerns the Tax Commission's
constitutional authority to administer the tax laws of Utah.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMISSIONS AUTHORITY TO LOWER A TAXING ENTITY7 S
RATE IS NOT LIMITED TO THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE
RATE EXCEEDS THE MAXIMUM RATE SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE
ANN.§ 59-2-908.
The first statement of concern is in % 10 of the

decision where the Court stated,
The statute clearly states that the
Division may only lower the tax rate if
it exceeds the "maximum levy." See id. §
1
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59-2-914(1) (a) . The maximum levy is
defined by statute as: ".0032 per dollar
of taxable value in all counties with a
total taxable value of more than
$100,000,000. .. ." Id. § 59-2-908(1) (a)
(1996). The Commission acknowledged
during oral argument that Alpine's
adopted tax rate does not exceed this
figure.

T

The Commission is concerned that this paragraph
suggests that a county may levy a tax rate in excess of the
certified rate, if it is below the wmaximum levy," without
going through the truth-in-taxation procedures.

The

statutes are clear, as well as the briefs of both parties,
in stating that a taxing entity's rate cannot exceed the
certified rate unless the truth-in-taxation procedures of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-918 and 919 have been completed.

See

Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-912 (1996), 59-2-918 (1999) and 59-2919 (1999). With the exception of the portion of the opinion
quoted above, it appears that the Court understood the law
in this manner as well.
For example, if the certified rate is .0025 and the
county proposes a rate of .0028, this rate cannot be
enforced unless the truth-in-taxation requirements have been
met despite the fact that .0032 is the "maximum levy"
allowed by law.

This Court must recognize that the

2
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Commission has the authority to adjust a rate in excess of
the certified rate if the truth-in-taxation procedures have
not been satisfied.

Without such a finding, the Court's

language as cited above may be inappropriately interpreted
in a manner that eviscerates part of the truth-in-taxation
statutes.
The Commission suggests the following language to
replace the language of the opinion cited above:
"•}/'•,j

The Commission has authority to adjust
any tax rate that exceeds the certified
rate unless the taxing entity complied
with the truth-in-taxation requirements
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 918 and 919 (1999
and Supp. 2 000). Once a taxing entity
has complied with the truth-in-taxation
procedures, the Commission is without
authority to adjust the adopted rate
unless the statutes provide otherwise.
In this case, Section 59-2-924(g) (Supp.
2000) does not provide such authority nor
does Section 59-2-914 (1999) since Alpine
satisfied the truth-in-taxation
procedures and its rate did not exceed
the maximum rates allowed by law.
The Court is advised that the statutes contain maximum
rates for many different taxing entities.

The maximum rate

of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-908 (Supp. 2000) which applies to a
county is one of many.1

For example, maximum rates can be

1

The Court is reminded that the rate at issue in this
case was not a county rate, but a school district rate.
3
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found in the following additional sections of the Utah
Code, §§ 10-6-133, 10-7-14.2, and 17A-1-430.

Additionally,

school districts such as Alpine are governed by their own
complex set of statutes which set forth minimum and maximum
rates for property tax levies which vary depending upon the
purpose of the levy or use of the tax.

See e.g., Utah Code

Ann. §§ 53A-17a-143, 53A-17a-135, and 53A-16-106.
II.

THE COMMISSION IS GRANTED CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IN
SUPPORT OF ITS DUTY TO ADMINISTER THE TAX LAWS OF UTAH.
The second statement in question, found in f 13 of this

Court's decision, reads:
We disagree. We cannot conclude that this
constitutional provision is selfexecuting. A self-executing provision is
one that "can be judicially enforced
without implementing legislation."
Spackman v. Board of Educ. of Box Elder
County, 2000 UT 87, % 7. As stated by the
Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he tax commission
is created by statute and has only such
powers as the statute confers upon it."
E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 109
Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324, 328 (1946).
Contrary to the statement above, the Utah Supreme Court
has fully recognized the constitutional authority of the
Commission.

In Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah

State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 1997), the Court held
that the Utah constitution prohibits the legislature from

4
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conferring "the Commission's powers on other governmental
entities." Id at 442. Moreover, the Court went to great
lengths to recognize the "Commission's constitutionally
bestowed power to adjust and equalize the valuation and
assessment of property..." Id at 440.
In addition, the Court quoted from Article XIII,
Section 11 of the Constitution saying, u[u]nder such
regulations in such cases and within such limitations as the
Legislature may prescribe, it shall review proposed bond
issues, revise the tax levies of local governmental units,
and equalize the assessment and valuation of property within
the counties." Id. at 441.

Based on the above statements,

the Court made it clear that the Commission does have
authority independent from the Legislature.
Further support for the Commission's constitutional
authority comes from the Utah Supreme Court in Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 190
(Utah 1991).

There, the Court noted that the tax

commission, under article XIII, has to a large degree
assumed control over the local administration of the
property tax system."

Id.

The Commission proposes that the following paragraph be

5
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inserted in place of the language of the Court's opinion
quoted above:
Although the Constitution grants the
Commission authority pertaining to the
levies of local entities, the
Constitution plainly authorizes the
legislature to limit this authority. The
legislature has limited such authority in
this case through the enactment of
Section 59-2-914 (1999).

r

This suggested language is consistent with this Court's
decision and more closely harmonizes this Court's decision
with the prevailing case law established by the Utah Supreme
Court.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission respectfully petitions this Court
for a rehearing to clarify two points of law contained in
the decision.

The Commission respectfully suggests that

this Court change the language in ff 10 and 13 described
above in order to make the opinion consistent with
established law. These statements will not affect the
outcome of this case.
It is not the intent of the Commission to quibble with
the Court over every phrase of its decision.

However, the

Commission does point out the two stated errors so that the
Court will have the opportunity to correct its opinion if it
6
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deems appropriate.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ^

day of November,

2000

TIMOTHY A
Assistant

7
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torney Ge
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This opinion is subject to revision before •
publication in the Pacific Reporter.,.--: .
~T L V

i

'•• '•'.'• '•""'!-'

Utah Court of Appeals
NOV 16 2000
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS'""

PailletteStagg

Clerk of the Court
00O00- —

Alpine School District Board
of Education,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No, 20000109-CA

Petitioner,

FILED
(November 16, 2000)

v.
State Tax Commission, Property
Tax Division,

2000 UT App 319

Respondent.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys: Brinton R. Burbidge and Paul D. Van Komen, Salt Lake
City, for Petitioner
Jan Graham and Timothy A. Bodily, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Davis.
BENCH, Judge:
Kl
Petitioner Alpine School District (Alpine) appeals the
decision of the Utah State Tax Commission (Commission), which
upheld the lowering of Alpine!s 1999 adopted tax rate by the
Commission's Property Tax Division (Division). Alpine contends
that the Division has no statutory authority to reduce Alpine's
adopted tax rate. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
%2 Alpine formulated a budget for the 1999 tax year. After
this budget was approved, the Division notified Alpine of its
certified tax rate for ad valorem property tax. Within this
certified tax rate was an adjustment for the change in the motor
vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue, effective that year. This
1. The certified tax rate is "a tax rate that will provide the :
same ad valorem property tax revenues for a taxing entity as were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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adjustment was based on an estimate by the Division of what the
motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue would be.
i

H3
When Alpine received notification of its certified tax rate,
it realized the rate would be inadequate to meet the needs of its
budget. Therefore, Alpine proposed to the taxpayers an ad
valorem tax rate higher than its certified tax rate. Alpine
complied with the requirements commonly referred to as "truth in
taxation" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-918 and 59-2-919
(1996 & Supp. 2000). The taxpayers approved Alpine's proposed
tax rate and this rate was submitted to the Division.
1|4 In the meantime, the Commission discovered an error in the
Division1s calculation of the motor vehicle fee-in-lieu
adjustment to the certified tax rate. When recalculated, the
resulting certified tax rates were lower than those originally
reported to the taxing entities. After Alpine submitted its
adopted tax rate, which had been approved by the taxpayers, the
Division lowered the rate by the same amount it had determined
Alpine's certified tax rate should be lowered.
^5
The Division claimed it had statutory authority to
unilaterally lower Alpine's rate pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§
59-2-914 and 59-2-924 (1996 & Supp. 2000) . Alpine appealed to
the Commission the Division's adjustment of its adopted rate.
The Commission recognized that the Division could not lower
Alpine's adopted rate under section 59-2-914 alone, since Alpine
had complied with the truth in taxation requirements. The
Commission nonetheless upheld the Division's action based on its
reading of sections 59-2-914 and 59-2-924 together.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
^6
The issue concerns whether the Division had authority under
either section 59-2-914 or section 59-2-924 to lower Alpine's
adopted tax rate. In reviewing the Commission's decision, we
"grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of
law, applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an
explicit grant of discretion contained in a statue at issue
1. (...continued)
collected by that taxing entity for t^ie prior year." Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-924(2) (a) (1)—(Supp. 2000). Prior to 1999, property
taxes on certain tangible personal property, such as motor
vehicles, were based on value. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-405.1
(Supp. 2000), enacted in 1998, provides that starting in 1999,
the taxes on tangible personal property include a uniform fee
based on the age of the motor vehicle. ;--••-- v.-:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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before the appellate court." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(b)
(1996). The issue presented for our review is one of statutory
interpretation, which is a question of law, and the Commission
has been given no-specific grant of discretion to interpret the
statutes at issue. See Airport Hilton Ventures v. Tax Comm'n,
1999 UT 26,^7, 976 P.2d 1197. Therefore, we give no deference to
the Commission's interpretation.
ANALYSIS
\l
Preliminarily, we discuss the Commission's belatedly filed
Motion Regarding Suggestion of Mootness. The Commission contends
that recent legislative changes requiring the Commission to make
adjustments to certified tax rates to equalize any errors in the
1999 fee-in-lieu revenue estimates, as well as the fact that
Alpine adopted a tax rate higher than the certified tax rate in
2000, render moot the Commission's decision on the 1999 tax rate.
Thus, any harm Alpine may have experienced in subsequent years,
based on the lowering of its 1999 tax rate, was abrogated by its
adoption of a 2$00 tax rate that was higher than its 1999 tax
rate. The Commission concedes, however, that the broader issue
of whether the Division has authority to alter a taxing entity's
adopted rate may well arise in the future.
U8
We have said that "'[a] case is deemed moot when the
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the
litigants.1" 49th St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 998
n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)). The rights of a taxing entity such as
Alpine to adopt a tax rate pursuant- to statute without the
Division unilaterally changing it are surely not negated by the
fact that the taxing year in question has come and gone and
subsequent measures were taken to correct the monetary
difference. When a case "presents an issue that affects the
public interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief
time that any one litigant is affected, is capable of evading
review," we will address the merits of the case. Burkett, 773
P.2d at 44.
\S
The Commission argues on appeal that section 59-2-914 gives
the Division the authority to reduce Alpine's adopted tax rate.
That section provides, ,in part: " [i]f the commission determines
that a levy established for a taxing entity . . . is in excess of
the maximum levy permitted by law, the .-commission shall. .• •
lower the levy so that it is set at the maximum level permitted
by law." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914(1) (a) (1996). The Commission
interprets this section to grant the Division broad discretion in
determining whether a levy is in excess of the maximum, and then
to reduce the levy to an appropriate level.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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^10 The Commission found that Alpine complied with the
requirements of sections 59-2-918 and 59-2-919, which require a
taxing entity to notify taxpayers of a proposed rate increase in
excess of the certified rate, and to hold hearings regarding the
increase. See id. §§ 59-2-918, -919 (1999), This finding
notwithstanding, the Commission claims that because the erroneous
information the Division had provided Alpine regarding the
certified tax rate was then used in the notice to taxpayers
during the truth in taxation process, the Division had authority
to lower the adopted rate. This interpretation is not consistent
with the plain language of the statute. The statute clearly
states that the Division may only lower the tax rate if it
exceeds the "maximum levy." See id. § 59-2-914 (1) (a). The
maximum levy is defined by statute as: ".0032 per dollar of
taxable value in all counties with a total taxable value of more
than $100,000,000 . . . ." IcL § 59-2-908(1)(a) (1996). The
Commission acknowledged during oral argument that Alpine's
adopted tax rate does not exceed this figure.
Ull The Commission also argues that section 59-2-924(2) gives
the Division th£ authority to lower Alpine's adopted tax rate.
That section reads:
(f) For the calendar year beginning on
January 1, 1999, and ending on December 31,
1999, a taxing entity's certified tax rate
shall be adjusted by the amount necessary to
offset the adjustment in revenues from
uniform fees on tangible personal property
under Section 59-2-405.1 as a result of the
adjustment in uniform fees on tangible
personal property under Section 59-2-405.1
enacted by the Legislature during the 1998
Annual General Session.
Id. § 59-2-924 (2) (f) (Supp. 2000). The Commission alleges that
this section was added to avoid any possible shortfalls or
windfalls to taxing entities as a result of the change in fee-inlieu of ad valorem taxes charged on motor vehicles, which
revenues are factored into an entity's certified tax rate. The
Commission cites to statements made by legislators during Senate
floor debates to derive the intent of the statute. In
interpreting a statute, however, we are "guided by the principle
that a statute is generally construed according to its plain
language." Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah
1995). Further, "f [w]hen language is clear and unambiguous, it
must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for
construction.!" Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v.
Frederick. 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (quoting Hanchett v.
Burbidge, 59 Utah 127., 135, 202 P. 377, 380 (1921))."'Only when
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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we find ambiguity in the statutefs plain language need we seek
guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy
considerations.1" Nelson, 905 P.2d at 875 (quoting World Peace
Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah
1994)).
Hl2 We do not dispute that section 59-2-924(2) (f) gives the
Division statutory authority to reduce a taxing entity's
certified tax rate pursuant to fluctuations in fee-in-lieu
revenues. However, to also grant the Division authority to
reduce a tax rate properly adopted under truth in taxation is to
go well beyond the plain language of the statute. The
legislature took great care in defining "certified tax rate" and
providing the method for calculating the certified tax rate. See
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924 (2) (a) (i), (iii) (Supp. 2000). The
legislature also differentiated between a certified tax rate and
one adopted by the taxing entity through the truth in taxation
procedures outlined in sections 59-2-918 and 59-2-919. We
"presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning." Nelsfon, 905 P.2d at 875. We therefore conclude that
section 59-2-924(2) (f) gives the Division the authority to adjust
an entity's certified tax rate only.
Hl3 Finally, at oral argument before this court, the Commission
argued that it has a broad grant of constitutional authority to
adjust tax rates pursuant to Article XIII, Section 11 of the Utah
Constitution. Paragraph (3)(d) provides that the Commission
M
[u]nder such regulations in such cases and within such
limitations as the Legislature may prescribe, . . . shall . . .
revise the tax levies of local governmental units . . . ." Utah
Const, art. XIII, § 11(3) (d). The Commission interprets this
language as giving it unfettered authority to revise tax levies,
except for specific statutory limitations. We disagree. We
cannot conclude that this constitutional provision is selfexecuting. A self-executing provision is one that "can be
judicially enforced without implementing legislation." Spackman
v. Board of Educ. of Box Elder County, 2000 UT 87,^7. As stated
by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he tax commission is created by
statute and has only such powers as the statute confers upon it."
E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324,
328 (1946). The language in section 59-2-914 (giving the
Division the authority to lower tax rates that exceed the maximum
levy) and in section 59-2-924(2) (f) (giving .the Division
authority to reduce the certified tax r&te) are legislative
grants of specific authority. In granting such specific
authority, the legislature necessarily limited the circumstances
in which the Division is authorized to adjust tax rates. The
general language in the constitution regarding the Commission's
duties, therefore, does not broaden the statutory mandate. Where
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the legislature enacts regulations governing when tax rates can
be adjusted, as it did in sections 59-2-914 and 59-2-924, the
constitution simply directs that th6 Commission is the state
agency authorized to carry out those duties.
CONCLUSION
f14 The Division had no authority under sections 59-2-914 and
59-2-924(2) (f) to reduce the adopted tax rate of Alpine,
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Commission.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Hi5

WE CONCUR:t

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

